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Abstract 
This paper uses the Johansen cointegration technique to examine the causal relationship between aid 
inflows and economic growth for Ghana during the period 1970-2013. To better reflect causality, 
corruption (governance) and trade are included as control variables. In order to test for causality in the 
face of cointegration among variables, a vector error correction model (VECM) is used in place of vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model. This is complemented with Toda and Yamamoto’s test to point to causal 
direction. Appropriate stability test to account for structural breaks in the series is undertaken. Our 
estimation results suggest that GDP growth has one cointegrating vector relationship with governance, 
EU aid inflows and trade in both short and long runs. There is a long run unidirectional causal relationship 
from EU Aid inflows to GDP growth, and a short run unidirectional causality from trade to GDP. 
Governance was ineffective to power growth. The error correction terms are the source of causation in 
the long. The results indeed confirm popular conjecture that corruption in Ghana stifles development. 
Therefore government’s decision to launch a national anti-corruption plan in 2011 though long overdue, 
but is justifiable. However, such an attempt will only be effective if and only if a conscious effort is made 
by all stakeholders to work in hand in deepening good governance (reducing corruption) as a trajectory 
for promoting economic growth and to serve as inducement for a continue aid inflows from multilateral 
donors to sustain efforts at achieving the millennium development goals in Ghana. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption as a social issue is widespread and continues to dominate many discussions in both 
academic and policy circles due to the devastation it has on development. The subject area has also 
been revisited in recent times following the massive loot reported by the European Union anti-corruption 
agency. The agency reveals that corruption alone cost the EU over EUR 120 billion per year, an estimate 
just less than the annual budget of the EU (EC, 2014: p.3). A similar report from the World Bank 
estimates that every year between $20 to $40 billion are lost from developing countries due to corruption 
and bribery, but the bane also impacts developed economies (UN, 2013). The scourge on developed 
economies is as a result of the commitments they make in the form of Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) often captured as aids, grants and loans to promote development in disadvantaged economies. 
Likewise in Ghana, incidental and systematic corruptions are perceived to be high and is thought to be 
responsible for the slow pace of development (Lamptey, 2013). Several underlying factors are believed to 
be the root causes of corruption, but in the case of developing economies like Ghana, whose budgetary 
demands depend on the fluidity of financial pledges from development partners, it increasingly makes it 
an important source to investigate. Ghana currently ranks 98th out of 144 countries on the global 
percentile measure of irregular payment of bribes in public contracts based on the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) executive opinion, a trend which indicates weak institutional structures (WEF, 2014). 
Foreign aids come in different forms for different purposes. Currently, the world’s poorer countries 
activities are funded with aid from foreign governments and international organizations. Foreign aid may 
include billion dollar reconstruction projects in war-torn countries, microfinance programs for impoverished 
women, international research to find more productive crops and less polluting energy sources, 
expansion of primary education in rural regions, financing health budget, supporting economic reforms, 
debt relief and civil society development programs in Africa. The number of participants involved in 
providing foreign aid has increased which include but not limited to IMF, World Bank, the Asian, African, 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Japan, Western Europe but also, with an estimated 
thirty governments having significant programs of foreign aid, including rich North American. The 
purposes of aid are classified into different dimensions some of which is to improve the human condition 
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in poor countries, others to combat terrorism, humanitarian relief, promote democracy and culture, 
economic and social transitions, preventing and mitigating conflict (See Lancaster, 2007).  
The upsurge in aid flow has mainly been due to international attention towards the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The United Nations Millennium Declaration and Monterrey Consensus in 
Mexico in 2002 explicitly committed industrialized countries to “grant more generous development 
assistance because substantial increase in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) would be required 
to achieve the MDGs” (UN, 2002). These international agreements have helped to increase the 
commitment of aid following a substantial weakening during the 1990s. In 2010, net ODA inflows from 
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD reached a staggering $128.7 
billion, the highest level ever in nominal terms (OECD, 2010) with a bulk of this investment going to the 
social sector as opposed to productive sectors like agriculture. Studies on multilateral aid allocation have 
shown that the European Union is the most dominant aid donor in the world over the last decade.  Before 
the Cold War, when EU members’ preferences were largely heterogeneous, EU multilateral aid generally 
benefited the poorest states, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) but this trend changed after EU 
preferences converged on aiding the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the 
European Union, African countries have lost out on important aid flows since then. Sub-Saharan Africa 
receives the largest volume of ODA relative to other regions yet it is the region where most LDCs are 
located and where most countries are ‘off-track’ towards the MDGs. Total ODA as of 2009 stood at 
$165.4 billion with sub-Saharan Africa receiving 25.5% (approximately $42.2 billion) (See OECD, 2010), 
but of the 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 33 are in Africa and only 10 in Asia. 
Ghana as a developing country relies heavily on aid to remain solvent in meeting its annual 
budgetary demands. Foreign aid constituted the third largest source of foreign capital inflows in Ghana for 
the year 1999 with a dollar value of $451.7 million (Bhasin & Obeng, 2007) and there was a steady 
increment in the inflow of aids from 2004 till late 2008 where there was a marginal decline. The EU 
condition that enjoins recipient economies to undertake policies to reform institutions, to ensure 
macroeconomic stability and security to attract development aid have been embraced by Ghana. The 
Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663), implemented in December 2003, the Fair Wages Salary 
Commission Act 2007 (Act 737) and the adoption of democracy in 1992 resulted in the strengthening of 
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ombudsman institutions such as the Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) and the maintenance 
of a sound and resilient macroeconomic environment (see Forson & Opoku 2014). All these reforms and 
achievements have led to unprecedented inflow of aid but 2012 country report suggests that out of the 
eight MDGs only reducing extreme poverty by half is on track (GoG, 2012). A concern over how these aid 
inflows from multilateral agencies have inured to the benefit of Ghanaians in the broader sense has been 
raised and is a question that has not been adequately addressed. Even though there are series of 
inductive studies that attempts to link the state of Ghana’s underdevelopment to elements of governance 
(corruption), none have actually used deductive approach such as cointegration to empirically prove the 
conjectures made thereof (See Lloyd et al., 2001). One is therefore left to wonder if there is any causal 
relationship between aid inflows and economic development in Ghana. Is there any causal relationship 
between aid inflow and institutional reforms? This research seeks to address these concerns by 
capitalizing on the availability of longitudinal data on institutional quality and macroeconomic variables.  
Motivated by the fore-going perspectives, the study is driven by three objectives. To begin with, 
the study would like to assess the effect of aid inflows on Ghana’s economy. Secondly, to investigate 
whether multilateral donor’s selective policy that requires recipient countries to undertake institutional 
reforms to curb corruption and others is indeed responsible for the continued inflows of aid to Ghana’s 
economy and its implication for development. Thirdly, to formulate policy recommendations based on 
these findings. To achieve these aims, the study employs appropriate econometric approaches that are 
able to capture the cause and effect mechanism of selected variables. Because most macroeconomic 
variables are thought to be stationary, the use of conventional regression estimators such as OLS 
technique tends to produce misleading results. To overcome this problem,  Granger (1986) and Johansen 
(1991) came up with a tool based on the concept of cointegration which is now commonly used to 
analyze long-run equilibrium relationships. The strength of the cointegration approach lies in that fact that 
it allows non-stationary data to be examined in the long-run and at the same time it is able to tell the order 
of integration among variables. It also captures the short term adjustment mechanisms that occur when 
variables converge at the long run equilibrium position (Forson & Janrattanagul 2014).  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The literature on the triggers of corruption in developing economies has changed cause in recent 
years with aid inflows being arguable the dominant source in sub-Sahara Africa. The principles of aid-
giving are guided by need-based aid and strategic based aid. The need based aid looks at the poor 
economic characteristics of recipient economies while strategic-based aid, focuses on the economic 
interest of the donor by aligning it with developmental needs of recipients. Governments and institutions 
direct their assistance to countries that are strategically important, in terms of national politics, military and 
commercial interests. The drawback of strategy-driven aid is the enforcement of the conditions associated 
with the aid because the objective of the aid is achieved immediately disbursement occurred. Recipient 
countries are not motivated to comply with the conditions associated with aid disbursements which have 
direct consequences on aid effectiveness. The ineffectiveness has directed attention to multilateral aid 
institutions that implement and supervise the development goals established in the contract. The literature 
supports multilateral aid effectiveness in reducing poverty than bilateral aid because their conditionality 
carries more weight in the developing countries’ policy-making.  
Meanwhile, the subject of aid effectiveness has been researched into, especially in SSA. In a 
paper presented by Gomanee et al., (2002) at a conference based on an empirical study on 25 Sub-
Saharan African countries on the effectiveness of aid, investment to growth pointed out that for each 1% 
in aid received as a share of GNI, there is a one-quarter of percentage points on growth among the 
studied 25 countries. They therefore concluded that the state of poorer African countries should not be 
attributed to aid ineffectiveness, yet the study failed to propose an alternate reason accounting for the 
state of these poorer African countries. According to Maizels and Nissanke (1984), in recipient-needs 
model, “aid is given to compensate for the shortfalls in domestic resources,” whereas in the donor-
interests model, aid serves donors’ “political and commercial investment, and trade interests. While most 
of recipient-needs model received much attention on multilateral, bilateral allocation goes to beef up 
“political and commercial interest of donors’. However, evidence on the linkage between aid inflows and 
institutional reform to mitigate corruption still remains a fallacy as this notion has proven otherwise in 
recent studies. For instance, Ohler et al.,(2012) investigates whether the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) was successful in promoting better control of corruption using difference-in-difference-
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in-difference (DDD) approach. They find strong anticipation effect soon after the announcement of the 
MCC, while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of MCC aid appears to have weakened 
the incentives to fight corruption over time (See further Knack, 2013). Thus pointing out to the vague 
axiom that presupposes aid inflows are meant to enhance well-being. 
In the meantime, with the introduction of the “New Public Administration” ideology, the focus has 
been on strengthening institutional framework to reduce corruption. Although this sounds plausible, other 
researchers have divergent views on this. For instance, Alesina and Weder (2002) asserts that corrupt 
governments tend not to receive less aid than clean governments. Dollar and Levin (2004) on the other 
hand observed that, over time, aid has been directed more towards countries with sound institutions and 
policies. Eric Neumayer provided a detailed analysis of the relationship between aid and human rights in 
series of studies on the United Nations. In one of those studies, Neumayer (2003a) points out that aids 
from UN agencies tend to respond to economic and human-development needs, but not necessarily to 
political freedom and corruption. In another study, Neumayer (2003b) concludes that a high level of rights 
or improvements in rights means higher bilateral aid, but warned that the role of rights is limited and did 
not increase after the end of the Cold War. However, even though respect for rights tends to play a role at 
the selection stage, there is significant inconsistency in the application of rights to the determination of the 
levels of bilateral aid (Neumayer, 2003a). In recent times, good governance has become conditionality for 
the disbursement of development assistance to less developed nations (Fayissa & Nsiah, 2010).  
The debate on this conditionality was further fuelled following World Bank publication in 1998 on 
Aid assessment policy to poorer countries with institutional challenges. The policy decision of the 
publication was to adopt selectivity approach since the effectiveness of aid could be increased if more 
was allocated to countries with good policies.  The argument is that ‘aid does not work’ in the sense that 
the amount of aid alone has no effect on growth, but aid makes a positive contribution to growth in those 
countries with good policy (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). Also, policy reform conditionality does not work 
since donors have less power to influence policies and institutions in recipients’ economies let alone by-
passing government in implementing expenditures (Collier & Dollar, 2004: p.245). Hence, more aid 
should go to nations already implementing good policies to boost the effort of poverty alleviation process. 
However, opponents have challenged selective aid allocation (See Hansen & Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 
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2004). The contention is that aid has contributed to poverty reduction and improving the welfare of the 
poor independent of recipient policies (Mosley et al., 2004; Gomanee et al., 2002). The ineffectiveness of 
conditionality is also contested on the ground that the specific reforms advocated by donors are hardly 
implemented fully within the relatively short time period of the associated aid program (Mosley et al., 
2004; Koeberle et al., 2005; Lensink & Morrissey, 2000). In an attempt to contextualize this in Ghana, 
Lloyd et al.,(2001) investigates the relationship between aid inflows, trade and growth  with the contention 
that, export, aid and public investment are all positively related to long run growth. However, in the pre-
1983 era, they find export and public investment to have negative impact on short run growth, with no 
significant impact reported on aid. The results for post reform era (after 1983) they assert show a 
significant improvement in the statistical significance of these variables. This they attributed to institutional 
reforms which enhance government machinery. Yet we found a gap in the type of proxy used in 
measuring governance (or institutional inputs) and hence argue that such linkage cannot be vaguely 
made unless such deficiency in variable measurement is sorted out.  
 
2.1 Ghana’s Foreign Aid in Perspective 
From 1970 to 2002 total ODA to SSA stood at $318.8 billion which compares with $214.1 billion 
to Asia over the same period. SSA pattern of aid flow is not quite different from Ghana as a country. 
Specifically, ODA to Ghana has increased from 9.5% of GDP to 10.4 per cent of GDP between 1970 and 
2005 (MOFEP, 2010). Aid as a share of GDP increased from 13.2% in 2003 to 14.6% in 2009 and 
dropped slightly to 12.8% in 2010. Successful implementation of economic reforms of the 1980s under 
the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and Economic Recovery Program (ERP) respectively coupled 
with a subsequent return to constitutional rule in 1992 has been the driving force for the substantial aid 
inflows to Ghana. Development aid to Ghana comes in the form of debt relief from the Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative (MDRI) and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative; project aid (loans and 
grants for supporting specific projects and activities); general sector and budget support; and balance-of-
payments support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Both traditional and non-traditional donors 
provide aid to Ghana. Traditional donors currently comprise 23 multilateral and 24 bilateral donors 
(MOFEP, 2010).  
8 
 
The multilateral donors include the World Bank, European Union, European Investment Bank, 
Nordic Development Fund, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, African Development Bank 
OPEC Fund for International Development, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Global Fund and Alliance for 
preventable diseases like malaria, tuberculosis, etc., and 12 agencies of the United Nations. So far World 
Bank and European Union are the largest multilateral donors, providing about 45 per cent of the 
multilateral average (Quartey et al., 2010).  
 
Table 1 Ghana Overseas Development Assistance in Millions (US$) 
YEAR   2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total   1003.1 1130.1 1205.8 14781 1656.5 1649.6 2102.5 1896.8 
*IMF 
 
76.6 38.7 38.2 116.6 0 0 200 200 
Debt Relief  Grants  154.2 174.1 196.9 307.3 342.7 229.5 289.6 235.8 
Budget Support  277.9 316.7 313.2 349.3 386.7 473.1 700.4 619.2 
**EU   154.2 174.1 196.9 209.8 246.1 158.4 181.9 168.8 
Project Aid  494.4 600.6 657.5 698.6 927 947 912.5 841.8 
GDP   7621 8853 10726 12729 14984 16085 14385 14870 
 Total (ODA % of 
GDP) 13.2 12.8 11.2 11.6 11.1 10.3 14.6 12.8 
Source: Adopted from Quarterly et al., (2010) and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning report 
(2010). 
Note: **Denotes multilateral donor of interest 
  
Table 1 above shows the various classes of aid inflows from both traditional and non-traditional 
donors. Project aid dominates the trend beginning US $494.4 million in 2003 with a steady rise to $912.5 
million in 2009 with a subsequent fall to $841.8 million. Aid for budget mimicked this trend. Aid from the 
EU has seen a significant trend of improvement beginning 2003 ($154.2 million) to 2007 ($246.1 million). 
Since 2008, the trend has shown significant mix of rise and fall. The ensuing situation is attributed to the 
2008 global economic meltdown from the US and currently the EU crisis which intensified in the late 2010 
with Greece, Portugal and Spain fueling it. Total ODA as a share of GDP has been falling from 13.2% in 
2003 to 12.8% till the close of 2010. Figure 1 below shows the trend of EU Aid inflow to Ghana since 
1970 to 2012; 
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Figure 1 EU annual Aid Allocation to Ghana, 1970-2013 
 
With these inflows, significant developmental aid related projects have been undertaken with 
specific examples worth mentioning. The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) is the most prominent 
one.  Ghana, in 2006 signed a five-year compact worth US$547 million under the then Kufour’s 
administration with Bush’s administration. The total fund ear-marked under the Millennium Challenged 
Corporation was in excess of US $1.2 billion shared among selected developing countries. Ghana, due to 
the success chalked in its democratic dispensation, thus setting the pace for others to emulate earned 
half of this ear-marked fund. Working to meet the eight MDGs was central to the direction of Ghana’s 
compact. Among other things, reducing poverty through the mechanization of rural agriculture, 
transportation, and the provision of services for the rural poor were some of the detailed specifications of 
the compact. The program currently operates in about 30 districts where poverty rates are generally 
above 40 per cent. Most of these districts are in the three northern regions and southern horticultural belt 
in southeastern, including the Central Afram Basin in Ghana. So far, funds from the MCC has been used 
to support the training of farmers in commercial agriculture, irrigation development, improvements to the 
land tenure system, construction of road networks, and the provision of water and sanitation facilities for 
rural communities (MiDA, 2010). China, a nontraditional donor has supported Ghana government with an 
interest-free loan of US$30 million for the construction of the 16.9 kilometer Ofankor- Nsawam road in 
2002. The same government in 2006 gave Ghana a concessional loan of US$30 million to finance the 
first phase of the National Communications Backbone Network Project, which aim to connect all the ten 
regional capitals to the internet.  They also gave another US$30 million loan in 2007 to develop ICT 
0
50000000
100000000
150000000
200000000
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
EU_AID_INFLOW
EU_AID_INFLOW
10 
 
facilities for Ghana’s security agencies. The Chinese government also provided aid money for the 
construction of the Bui Hydro-Electric Power Dam, consisting of US$270 million in concessional loans 
and a US$332 million buyer credit facility. The construction work was undertaken by the Sino-Hydro 
Corporation and is scheduled to be completed in 2013 (Gyimah-Boadi &Yakah, 2010). The figure below 
shows the performance of Ghana’s economy from 1970 to 2013. 
Figure 2 GDP per capita of Ghana, (1970-2013) 
  
From figure 2 above, we are able to appreciate that despite the continuing support Ghana 
receives from multilateral donors; economic development has been relatively slow and less dramatic. The 
increase in per capita income from 2010 is as a result of the oil discovery. This provided an additional 
source of budgetary supplement from oil proceeds. Growth around this time could have possibly been 
triggered by new investments in the new oil industry.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, HYPOTHESES AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
3.1 Research Hypotheses 
Corruption:: Governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to 
manage a country’s affair at all level (UNDP, 1997). The concept has however been defined in different 
ways to highlight how subjective it could be. As a result, different institutions have collated and evolved 
their own measurements. The term is sometimes synonymous to corruption which is the abuse of the 
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entrusted power for private gain (Kaufmann et al., 2006b). It is also an institutional variant visualized 
when the mechanisms of public administration are non-functional as they ought to be. It is thought to be 
inimical to development, albeit this relationship has incurred mixed reactions from both grease in the 
wheel and sand in the wheel schools of thought. Thus the model relationship between governance 
(corruption) and Aid inflow and for that matter economic growth has received mixed reactions (See Aidt, 
2009; Burnside  & Dollar, 2000; Dietz et al., 2007; Fayissa & Nsiah, 2010; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; 
Lensink & Morrissey, 2000; Próchniak, 2013; Svensson, 2000). Therefore, we hypothesize that good 
governance (or reduction in corruption) will lead to increase in EU aid inflows which is expected to impact 
positively on economic growth. 
Aid Inflow: Aid inflow is the transfer of capital for the benefit of recipient country or its population 
(See Lancaster, 2007). EU Aid comes in different forms and purposes (i.e. economic, military, or even 
emergency humanitarian). Evidence on selective Aid allocation as a sine qua non for good governance 
and economic expansion abounds but have not been straightforward (See Fayissa and Nsiah 2010; 
Nunnenkamp & Thiele, 2006; Ohler et al., 2012; Hout, 2007a, 2007b; Easterly, 2007; Clist, 2009; Kargbo, 
2012; Ohler et al., 2012; Knack, 2013). However, in this study, we hypothesize that there will be a strong 
positive relationship between EU aid inflows and governance and for that matter economic growth in 
Ghana. 
GDP Per Capita Income: GDP per capita is an indicator of a country’s standard of living (Cypher 
& Dietz, 2009). Per capita income is computed by dividing gross domestic product by midyear population. 
The effect of per capita income on economic growth has been extensively discussed in related studies 
within the growth nexus. However, improved standard of living, reflected in per capita income is spurred 
by other factors which may either be explicit or implicit. Such factors may include effective institutional set 
up, capital inflows (either FDIs or aids) etc. Both the neoclassical and endogenous perspectives have 
highlighted the importance of initial income within the convergence discussion on growth with mixed 
reaction of negative and positive significant relationship (Cypher & Dietz, 2009; Forson et al., 2013; 
Kargbo, 2012; Mankiw et al., 1992; Solow, 1956). We will examine this relationship by hypothesizing that 
foreign aid inflow promotes growth by supplementing limited domestic savings as well as foreign 
exchange constraints in Ghana. We thus expect positive significant relationship. 
12 
 
Trade Openness: Trade openness is the removal of barriers or restrictions on the free exchange 
of goods and services (Dowling  & Valenzuela, 2010). It also includes the removal of tariffs and duties on 
imports and exports. The discussion on lower policy-induced barriers to international trade promote 
economic growth in countries with poorly developed institutions have changed cause with varying degree 
of findings. Several studies have found a general and positive relationship between trade openness and 
growth on average. It is a general view that without institutions, countries that integrate with world 
markets would become vulnerable to external shocks, possibly unleashing domestic conflicts and 
uncertainty which may be detrimental to growth. Thus, countries with weak institutions (governance) even 
when there is greater increase in trade openness may reduce growth ceteris paribus (See Federici & 
Montalbano, 2010; Haddad et al., 2012; Stensnes, 2006; Ulaşan, 2012). We, on the basis of the 
numerous institutional reforms undertaken in Ghana hypothesize that; greater increase in trade openness 
will positively induce growth.   
 
3.2 Data Description  
Data for the analysis are obtained from reputable organizations such as Bank of Ghana, World 
Bank, IMF, and Transparency International. These sources are considered reliable for any research 
project. The annual series is used for all the variables. The study uses GDP per capita income as a 
measure of economic growth; whiles good governance and or corruption consist of all the composite 
indicators from Transparency International extrapolated from 1996 to 1970. Trade as a percentage of 
GDP is used as a proxy for fiscal deficits to capture insufficiency of government revenue. GDP per capita 
and Aid inflows are deflated by the GDP implicit price deflator at the base year 2005 constant price. Aid 
inflows and trade are converted into natural logarithm to avoid heteroscedasicity and in order to have the 
estimation in elasticity for easy interpretation. The time series data spans from 1970 to 2013, covering 44 
years. We present the summary descriptive statistics of the variables at level specification in table 2 
below; 
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Table 2 Data Summary Statistics (at level specification) 
  Y GOV AID TRD 
Mean 456.248 3.423 7.098 1.665 
Median 431.706 3.400 7.421 1.662 
Maximum 766.051 4.500 8.222 2.065 
Minimum 320.772 2.400 4.000 0.801 
Std. 
Deviation 100.559 0.507 1.119 0.299 
Skewness 1.339 0.036 -1.737 -0.888 
Kurtosis 4.659 2.395 4.796 3.351 
     Jarque-Bera 18.187 0.680 28.028 6.006 
Probability 0.000112 0.711626 0.00001 0.049642 
Observation 44 44 44 44 
Note: A statistical summary of Ghana’s Governance, GDP Growth, EU Aid allocation, and Trade 
indicators at level specification. 
 
Table 2  provides the descriptive summary statistics (at level specification) generated with 
statistical software. All the macroeconomic variables are statistically significant at 5% except the 
institutional variable governance. In terms of skewness and kurtosis, all variables are within the 
acceptable range which means the series is without serious problem of outliers. Governance has a mean 
value of 3.423 with a standard deviation of 0.507. Per capita income recorded a mean of $456.248 USD 
dollars and a standard deviation of $100.559 USD dollars. EU aid inflow on the other hand has a mean of 
$7.098 million USD dollars with a corresponding standard deviation of $1.119 million USD dollars. Trade 
has a mean of 1.665% and a standard deviation of 0.299%. In general, the dispersion of values around 
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the mean indicates fairly normal distribution considering other key indicators. GDP per capita has the 
highest mean relative to governance and EU aid followed by trade having the least mean value. In a 
pairwise comparison, the variability of the variables shown by the standard deviation indicates that GDP 
per capita is highly volatile when compared to trade volatility of 0.299%. Governance volatility is relatively 
lower than that of EU aid volatility. However, in terms of correlation, we find GDP per capita and EU aid 
inflows to be mildly correlated (0.076). Correspondingly, the correlation between governance and EU Aid 
inflows is comparatively high (0.640). We graphically present the data summary for quick visual 
impression in figure 3 below; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Graphical illustrations of variables (at level) 
 
In view of the fact that a visual plot of the data is usually the first step in any time series analysis, figure 3 
above presents the graph of each variable. The figure shows that all the graphs of the selected variables are 
non-stationary, which is an indication that the respective means and variances of the selected variables are 
not constant. A cursory look at the graphs of Per capita GDP, governance, EU aid inflow and trade shows a 
conspicuous some fluctuations between 1970 and 2013. For instance, GDP per capita was down in the late 
70s and early 80s with a corresponding drop in aid inflows from multilateral donors. The 1979 violent coup 
d’état led by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) is one of the many factors that led to this (See 
US Department of State, 2014). Moreover, there was a devastating drought in the early 80s in Ghana (See 
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Ofori-Sarpong, 1986). This affected total output, hence the drop, but saw aid inflows increasing as 
multilateral donors such as the IMF and the World Bank were consulted for bailout. Nevertheless, this came 
with conditionalities. Key structural reforms became the launch-pad to accessing donor funds. The 
introduction of programs such as ERP and SAP became the normative approach to recover Ghana’s ailing 
economy of that time. 
 
3.3 Model Specification 
Presenting the analysis using graphical method is only an initial step in time series modeling. The 
concepts of stationarity and unit root are extremely relevant elements in time series analysis that cannot be 
overlooked. When ignored, there may be a high tendency of having spurious regression which may impinge 
on the credibility of the results. Against this backdrop, following  Johansen's (1991) approach, we test for 
cointegration and apply the vector error correction model (VECM) respectively. Through the cointegration 
approach, we able to assess changes in the long-run equilibrium relationships between the variables of 
interest on Ghana. However, before making any progress, it is equally imperative to determine the order of 
integration among these variables. This can best be done using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey, 
1988) to test for unit root. The ADF test is estimated in three different forms, each of which is based on a 
different hypothesis (Gujarati, 2003). These forms are specified below; 
 
𝑌𝑡 is a Random Walk and assumes the following form: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛿𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖  ∑ ∆𝑌𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=1
+  𝜀𝑖                                                                        (1) 
𝑌𝑡 is a Random Walk with an intercept: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽1  + 𝛿𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖  ∑ ∆𝑌𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑖                                                               (2) 
𝑌𝑡  is a Random Walk with an intercept and time trend: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽1  + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝛿𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖  ∑ ∆𝑌𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=1
+  𝜀𝑖                                                    (3)
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In addition, one can use the Phillips-Perron (PP) approach to detect unit root. Intuitively, the PP test 
is the same as ADF except that the PP test uses a non-parametric statistical method to handle serial 
correlation in the error term and does not include the lagged differences in the model. We describe the PP 
model below as follows;
 
𝑌𝑡 is a Random Walk and assumes the following form: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛿𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑖                                                                                                         (4) 
𝑌𝑡  is a Random Walk with an intercept: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽1  + 𝛿𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                               (5) 
 
𝑌𝑡   
is a Random Walk with an intercept and time trend: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽1  + 𝛽2𝑡 + 𝛿𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                  (6)
 
In each of the cases outlined above, the null hypothesis is that δ= 0; that is, there is a unit root, 
and the time series is non-stationary. The alternative hypothesis is that δ<0; that is, the time series is 
stationary. I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  null hypothesis, it p resupposes  that 𝑌𝑡 
is a  
stationary time series at I (0). Otherwise, we have to take the difference until the null hypothesis is 
rejected. Same procedure is followed in this research. The unit root test i s  detected in levels and first 
differences respectively. Having been able to prove that each o f  t h e  s e l e c t e d  variables has a unit 
root at level, we are required to take first difference in order to have a stationary data. Thus assuming 
each variable is integrated of the same order of first difference at I(1), then by implication it means that we 
can test for long-run equilibrium relationships using Johansen (1991)  cointegration method.  This  
a lso ind icates that  there will be at least one cointegration among these variables. The cointegration 
method is linked to the vector error correction model (VECM). Though the VECM is somehow similar to the 
VAR model, but in contrast to the VAR model, the VECM can be used when all endogenous variables are 
non-stationary and cointegrated. Moreover ,  the VECM a l lows  us  to account for short-term adjustments 
that occur on the path toward the long-run equilibrium. Precisely, assuming that v a r i a b l e  𝑌𝑡 is out of 
equilibrium and t h a t  its value is above (below) its equilibrium value, there is the tendency it will start 
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falling (rising) to correct the equilibrium error in the next period. We describe the vector error correction 
model (VECM) below: 
∆𝑌𝑡 =  𝜇 +  ∑ Γ𝑗  
𝑘−1
𝑗=1
Δ𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑑0𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼𝛽
′𝑌𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡                                                            (7) 
  
  
Where ∆ denotes the first difference order, for example, ∆𝑌𝑡 = (𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1).The term 𝑌𝑡 
represents 
variables on GDP, governance, EU aid, and trade that will be tested in this model and each variable is a p x 
1 vector integrated of the same order. 𝜇 is a p x 1 vector of constant.
 
The mechanism  ∑ 𝜏∆𝑌𝑡 − 1𝑘−1𝑗−1  
comprises the vector autoregressive components where the p x p matrix denotes the coefficients of 
variables’ short-run adjustments toward long-term equilibrium. 𝐷𝑡 is the dummy variable where 𝐷𝑡=1 if 𝑡 = 
1979; 1981/3 and1992, 𝐷𝑡 = 0 if 𝑡 ≠ 1979; 1981/3 and 1992. The equation 𝛼𝛽
′𝑌𝑡−𝑘describes the long-term 
equilibrium relationship (stationary linear combination of β’Y) where α stands for p x r speed of adjustment 
coefficient, 𝛽′denotes the cointegration vector with 𝑌𝑡 integrated of the same order, and k denotes the lag 
structure.
 
t  is the vector white-noise error term.
 
Although determining the exact order of cointegration among the variables is necessary, it might not 
be sufficient to establish the causal relationship among the variables of interest and ultimately economic 
development. As a consequence, there is the need to use the traditional Granger causality approach to 
unearth this seemingly relationship. This approach is the most common way to test for causal relationship 
between two variables and thus involves estimating a simple vector auto regression (VAR) equation, as 
shown below:
 
𝑋𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜇1𝑡                                                                          (8) 
 
𝑌𝑡 =  ∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜇2𝑡                                                                           (9) 
                                             
Where, the disturbances µ1t and µ2t are assumed to be uncorrelated. The two equations above 
(8) and (9) posit that variable X is decided by lagged variable Y and X except that the dependent variables 
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are interchanged in each case. Granger causality means that the lagged Y significantly influences X in 
equation (8) and vice-versa in equation (9); thus, researchers can jointly test if the estimated lagged 
coefficients ∑ 𝛼𝑖 and ∑ 𝜆𝑡 are different from zero with F-statistics. However, the traditional Granger causality 
test is plagued with many bottlenecks.  
To begin with, most pairwise granger causality test does not factor in the influence of other 
variables and as a result may suffer from specification bias. In a more precise way, causality test are 
sensitive to model specification and the number of lags of which makes evidence of pairwise causality more 
fragile and less credible (See Gujarati, 2003). Moreover, time series data are in most cases non-stationary, 
which could increase the probability of having spurious regression. Also, whenever the variables are 
integrated, the F-test procedure ceases to be valid due to the fact the test statistics does not have a standard 
distribution.  
In order to resolve these shortcomings, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) present an alternate 
approach that accounts for the limitations enumerated. Among other things, this test may be used 
irrespective of whether  𝑌𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡 are cointegrated of the order I(0), I(1) or I(2) and or whether they are non-
cointegrated. Toda and Yamamoto (1995) augmented Granger causality test is the name of the method and 
is based on the following equations; 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑘+𝑑
𝑖=1
𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝑘+𝑑
𝑗=1
𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇𝑦𝑡                                                                             (10) 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝛼 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑘+𝑑
𝑖=1
𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝑘+𝑑
𝑗=1
𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇𝑥𝑡                                                                                     (11) 
Where 𝑑 is the maximal order of integration of the variables in the system, h and k are the optimal 
lag length of 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡, and are error terms that are assumed to be white noise with zero mean, constant 
variance and no autocorrelation. We are required to determine the lag order of integration which by default 
occurs in the model, and to construct a VAR in their levels with a total of (𝑘 + 𝑑) lags.  
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Structural Break Test 
We begin the analysis with a validation test using Chow's (1960) approach to investigate if there 
was a structural break in the series as suspected. Based on the statistical result (not shown here), the test 
statistic is less than the 5% significant level. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no structural break in the series 
is rejected. This implies that the 1979 bloody coup d’état, the 1981-1983 drought and the 1992 change over 
to democratic rule did indeed have some effects on the relationship coexisting between GDP per capita and 
the three regressors. These break dates are therefore included as dummy in our model. 
We analyze the data by modifying the VECM models. That is, by detecting the data generating 
process (DGP), we can identify and assess the characteristics of each variable. To make any progress, there 
is the need to verify if our model should include components of an intercept and time trend. We then detect 
unit root on the variables GDP, governance, EU Aid inflows, trade and dummy. Our focus is on the set of 
variables that are integrated of the same order. The lag length must also be selected using appropriate 
statistical tool. This will assist in determining the order of cointegration. We have the option of selecting from 
commonly used tools such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz information criterion (SIC). 
To simplify this research, these two approaches are used. The trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics are 
relevant in determining the exact order of cointegration. Once this is done, we can progress to predict the 
long-term equilibrium relationship and error correction by regressing ∆𝑌𝑡 against the lag difference of ∆𝑌𝑡  
and 𝑌𝑡−𝑘 where 𝑌𝑡 represents the variables Per capita, Governance, EU Aid inflows, Trade, and dummy. 
 
4.2 Stationarity Tests 
The rule of thumb is that when time series data is stationary at level, it is known to be integrated 
of the degree 0 or I (0), but when we take arbitrary number of differences (say first, second, or third) to make 
it stationary, this is known to be integrated at I(1), I(2), or I(3), respectively. The ADF and the PP tests are 
commonly used to detect for stationarity test, and thus is adopted by this paper. The unit root tests are 
estimated based on eq. (1)-(6) for the intercept with time trend and an intercept only. We present the t-
statistics and p-values of the unit root test results in table 2 and 3 below; 
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Null Hypothesis: δ = 0 (each variable has a unit root). 
Alternative Hypothesis: δ < 0 (each variable does not have a unit root). 
Table 2 Results of Unit Root Test (Level Specifications) 
 
ADF   PP   ADF   PP   
At Level 
Intercept  Intercept 
Intercept and 
Trend 
Intercept and 
Trend 
t-stats 
p-
value 
Adj. t-
stat 
p-
value t-statistics p-value Adj. t-stat p-value 
Y -3.597 0.9981 2.007 0.9998 -4.192 0.9976 1.549 1.000 
GOV -3.081 0.355 -2.928 0.503 -3.519 0.499 -3.492 0.530 
Log(EU_Aid) -2.248 0.1930 -2.985 0.443 -2.911 0.169 -2.689 0.246 
Log (TRD) -1.526 0.511 -1.101 0.707 -2.531 0.313 -2.062 0.552 
Note: ** Denotes significance at the 5 % level where Y = G D P Pe r  c a p i t a  i n c om e , GOV = 
Composite Governance index, EU_AID = European Union Aid Allocation , TRD = Trade. 
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Table 3 Results of Unit Root Test (First Difference) 
 
ADF   PP   ADF   PP   
First Difference 
Intercept  Intercept Intercept and Trend Intercept and Trend 
t-stats p-value Adj. t-stat p-value t-stats p-value Adj. t-stat p-value 
Y -3.703 0.0076** -19.194 0.000** -5.926 0.000** -23.403 0.000** 
GOV -9.717 0.000** -9.686 0.000** -9.601 0.000** -9.571 0.000** 
Log (EU_Aid) -9.303 0.000** -9.681 0.001** -9.429 0.000** -13.093 0.001** 
Log(TRD) -4.867 0.000** -4.198 0.002** -4.834 0.000** -4.102 0.013** 
Note: ** Denotes significance at the 5 % level where Y = G D P Pe r  c a p i t a  i n c om e , GOV = 
Composite Governance index, EU_AID = European Union Aid Allocation , TRD = Trade. 
 
The values in Table 2 and 3 show the t-statistics and p-values at level. The results of the ADF and 
PP tests suggest our variables are cointegrated at the order 1(1). What this means is that, all the variables 
have unit roots at first difference. It should be noted that the identification of the data generating process 
(DGP) suggests that an intercept without time trend must be included in the tested equation. With all the 
variables integrated at 1(1) in table 2 and 3, we move to the next step to consider the long-run and short run 
equilibrium relationships. However, the appropriate lag length should be selected to aid in the estimation of 
the long run equilibrium relationship. 
 
Appropriate Lag Length Selection 
There are many ways to choose the optimal lag length in statistics, but the most commonly 
used ones include the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz information criterion (SIC). We 
use these same methods to select the appropriate lag length for our model. Table 4 indicates that LR, 
FPE, AIC, SIC and HQ show significant results at 1, 2 and 4 lag length periods respectively. This is 
straight forward and makes our work quite easy. The numbers with asterisks are the smallest value in each 
of the criteria. Before selecting the lag length, two issues have to be addressed. One has to understand that 
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too short a lag length in VAR may not capture the dynamic behavior of the variables. Conversely, it is also 
argued that too long a lag length may distort the data and lead to a decrease in power. Guided by these 
caution, the optimal lag length selected for these four institutional and macroeconomic variables is 
based on the SIC (Schwarz information criterion), which indicates a lag length of 1 period. 
 
Table 4 The Results of the Appropriate Lag length 
Lag Log L LR FPE AIC SIC HQ 
0 -183.4008 NA 0.137873 9.370041 9.538929 9.431105 
1 -99.90233 146.1223 0.004743 5.995117 6.839556* 6.300439* 
2 -81.11048 29.12737* 0.004234 5.855524 7.375515 6.405105 
3 -41.81454 22.83569 0.004322 5.809758 8.361822 6.528824 
4 -41.81454 25.73770 0.003587* 5.490727* 8.361822 6.528824 
Note: * Indicates lag order selected by the criterion presented in the table (each test at 5 % level). LR: 
sequential modified LR test statistic, FPE: Final prediction error, AIC: Akaike information criterion, SIC: 
Schwarz Information criterion, HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criteria. 
 
Cointegration Test for Long-run Equilibrium Relationships 
The empirical analysis in this paper is subject to linear relationship, hence less emphasis is laid on 
whether the variables have time trend or not. We reached this conclusion due to the existence of one 
cointegrating relationship among variables (see table 5). 
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Table 5 the Number of Cointegration Vectors 
Sample (Ghana): 1970- 2013 
   Included 
observations: 
44 
   Trend 
assumption: 
Linear deterministic trend 
  Series: Y GOV AID TRD 
   Lags interval: 1 to 1         
Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Trace)     
Ho HA Eigen value 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 Critical Value p-value 
r = 0  r > 0  0.737 97.892 68.819* 0.000** 
r ≤ 1  r > 1  0.457 41.864 47.856 0.1625 
r ≤ 2  r > 2  0.169 16.186 29.797 0.699 
r ≤ 3  r > 3  0.136 8.381 15.495 0.426 
r ≤ 4 r =0  0.052 2.249 3.841 0.134 
     
 Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Maximum Eigen 
value)     
Ho HA Eigen value 
Max-eigen 
stats 
0.05 Critical Value p-value 
r = 0  r = 1  0.737 56.027 33.877* 0.000** 
r = 1  r = 2 0.457 25.678 27.584 0.086 
r = 2 r = 3 0.169 7.805 21.132 0.915 
r = 3  r = 4 0.136 6.132 14.264 0.596 
r = 4 r =5 0.052 2.249 3.841 0.134 
Note: Trace test and Max-eigen value test indicate 1 co-integrating equation(s) at the 5% level 
*denotes rejection of the null hypothesize at the 5% level, ** MacKinnon p-value. 
 
Table 5 shows the trace and max-eigen statistics. The trace statistic, 97.892 is greater than the 
critical value 68.819. This implies that the null hypothesis  r = 0 can be rejected whiles the alternate 
hypothesis r > 0 accepted. The max-eigen value confirms the trace test results. The max-eigenvalue 
statistic 56.027 is larger than the critical value 33.877.Thus, t h e  null hypothesis r = 0 is rejected and 
the alternate hypothesis r = 1 accepted at a 5% significance level. In o th e r  words ,  both tests (trace 
and max-eigenvalue) con f i rm  tha t  t he re  is one cointegrating relationship among the five variables, 
meaning that in the long run, all the variables are cointegrated. We can proceed further to use the vector 
error correction model (VECM) to estimate the long and short run dynamics. 
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4.3 Long-term Cointegration Analysis 
The cointegration test is conducted for Ghana’s economic growth using GDP as dependent 
variable lagged on selected independent variables. Several tests for causality is performed here ; (1) long 
run causality – the significance of the error-correction terms by the t-test; (2) short run causality – the joint 
significance of the coefficients of lagged terms of each independent variable by Wald Chi-square tests and 
(3) Toda and Yamamoto causality tests- the joint significance of the four sources of causation. 
We begin by evaluating the robustness of the VECM against normality residual test of Jarque-
Bera, the ARCH test of serial correlation and the heteroscedasticity test. Using the histogram normality test, 
the Jarque- Bera is 14. 69, with p-value of 0.00065, which indicates that we reject the null hypothesis of the 
residual normally distributed at a 5% confidence level. This suggests the residual is not normally distributed. 
However, the other two tests passed the robustness checks. The ARCH test of heteroscedasticity indicates 
that the p-value of the obs*R-squared is 0.4872, which is greater than 5% confidence level. We accept the 
null hypothesis that there is no ARCH in this model. This is desirable as the model does not have ARCH 
effect. Using the Breusch- Godfrey serial correlation LM test, the p-value of the Obs*R-squared is 0.7103, 
which is greater than 5% confidence level. We accept the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation. 
On the basis of these two tests, the model is acceptable as the residuals are Gaussian white noise.  
The estimation of the VECM gives the long run cointegrating vectors as (1, -2.873, -0.868, -1.465, 
10.519) to represent GDP, governance, EU Aid inflows, trade, and the dummy variable respectively. This 
means that when corruption is high (bad governance), it negatively affects GDP. Similarly, when EU aid 
inflows to Ghana falls, there is a corresponding decrease in the level of per capita growth in income. A 
drastic reduction in trade may impact negatively on GDP. There is a lot of theoretical soundness in the 
cointegrating vectors and confirms related works in the literature (See Aidt, 2009; Haddad et al., 2012; 
Knack, 2013; Ohler et al., 2012; Próchniak, 2013; Stensnes, 2006; Ulaşan, 2012). The cointegration test was 
normalized with respect to GDP. The coefficient of the one period lagged residual confirms there is a long 
run causal relationship from the regressors to GDP with significant negative sign (Results not shown here). 
This implies that the four regressors share a long run causal relationship with the dependent variable GDP. 
In other words, governance, EU aid inflows, trade and the dummy share a long run relationship with GDP.   
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However, to estimate the short run relationship, the Chi-square value of Wald statistic is used. 
The rule of thumb for determining the short run causality is that if the coefficients of the cointegrating 
residuals from C (3) to C (6) in the estimated residual jointly influence GDP, then we can conclude there is 
short-run causality from these variables to GDP. Thus the null hypothesis becomes zero if c (3) =c (4) =c (5) 
=c (6) = 0. In other words, if the p-value under the chi-square is greater than 5%, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis; rather we accept the null hypothesis. However, the test result shows that the p-value of the chi 
square is less than 5% (0.0429). This implies the null hypothesis can be rejected to mean that governance, 
EU aid inflows and trade jointly causes GDP growth in the short run.  
However, according to Granger theorem, when variables are cointegrated, there must be an error 
correction (EC) that describes the short-run adjustments of the cointegrated variables as they move towards 
their long run equilibrium positions. We capture this in table 6 b e l o w . The findings are statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively and suggest that GDP, EU aid, trade and dummy are 
responsible for the error correction adjustment process when the variables are out of equilibrium. 
 
Table 6 Error correction Adjustment  
Co-Integrating Equation D(Y) D(GOV) D(AID) D(TRD) D(DUMMY) 
Adjustment Coefficient -1.298* 0.083 6.00E-02** -0.0168*** -0.328*** 
Standard Error 0.247 0.067 2.40E-02 0.009 1.8E-01 
t- values -5.249 1.232 2.530 -1.902 -1.795 
Note: * Denotes *p<0.01, **p<0.05, ***p<0.10 
The speed of adjustments for GDP per capita, trade and the dummy variables are negative. This implies 
when these variables are in disequilibrium from their long-term equilibrium in the short run or too high to be in 
equilibrium, they will begin falling in the following year by 1.298, 0.0168 and 0.328 percentage points 
respectively to be in equilibrium. However, the error correction term of EU aid inflow is positive. This implies 
when trade volume is too low in equilibrium, it will begin increasing in the following year by 0.06 percentage 
points to correct the equilibrium error. In general, the model confirms both long and short runs causation, but 
is unable to tell the direction of causality. To determine the direction of causality, Toda and Yamamoto’s test 
model in equation (10) and (11) is used in place of the traditional Granger as discussed (See table 7). 
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Table 7 T-Y Block Granger Exogeneity Test 
Dependent 
variable 
Excluded Variables           
2  Prob. 
Y AID 0.847 0.357 
 
GOV 0.049 0.825 
 
TRD 2.552 0.110 
 
DUMMY 1.324 0.249 
    AID Y 13.95 0.000* 
 
GOV 0.576 0.448 
 
TRD 0.158 0.691 
 
DUMMY 1.993 0.158 
    GOV Y 1.096 0.295 
 
TRD 0.274 0.708 
 
AID 0.14 0.600 
 
DUMMY 0.188 0.665 
    
TRD Y 4.536 0.033* 
 
GOV 2.171 0.140 
 
AID 0.62 0.431 
 
GOV 4.423 0.035* 
    
DUMMY Y 3.198 0.074** 
 
GOV 0.382 0.536 
 
AID 0.323 0.569 
  TRD 8.503 0.004* 
Note: Denotes *p<0.05, **p<0.10 level 
The F-statistics of the modified Wald test is calculated. In table 9, the T-Y causality test results 
shows that there is a unidirectional causality from EU aid inflows to economic growth in Ghana. Similar 
direction is evident between trade openness and economic growth. EU aid inflows and trade openness 
supplements domestic incomes and thus leads to economic growth in the short and long runs. This result is 
consistent with related studies in the literature (Gomanee et al., 2002; Hansen & Tarp, 2001; Kilby & Dreher 
2010; Lloyd et al.,  2001; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984). 
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5. POLICY IMPLICATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the causal relationship between EU Aid inflows and GDP in Ghana 
controlling for governance (corruption) and trade openness. The causal relationship between growth, 
governance, trade openness and EU aid inflow is based on pre-stated hypotheses. The statistical inference 
deduced from the Johansen model after testing for multivariate cointegration between GDP and the 
regressors indicates one cointegrating vector relationship. The dynamics of the variables in the short run 
indicates that the source of causality runs through governance, aid inflow, trade and the dummy to GDP. 
There is a long run unidirectional causal relationship from EU Aid inflows to GDP growth.  Governance on 
the other hand remained insignificant and ineffective to power growth, but shared a relatively stronger 
correlation with EU Aid inflows. This analogy confirms the increasing attempt to meet the selectivity criteria 
espoused by most multilateral donors as precondition in ODA assessment as governance and EU aid inflows 
are highly correlated with each other.  
The long run unidirectional causality from EU aid inflows to economic growth is confirmed by the 
negative coefficient and significance of the error correction term. The result supports the growth-led theses 
on income convergence in the literature (Cypher & Dietz, 2009; Forson et al., 2013; Kargbo, 2012; Mankiw et 
al., 1992; Solow, 1956). Therefore, effort of government and policy makers should be directed at meeting 
selectivity criteria to serve as inducement for continue inflow of aids to sustain efforts at meeting the MDGs 
and other developmental priorities. The short run unidirectional causality from trade to growth confirm 
existing literature (See Federici & Montalbano, 2010; Haddad et al., 2012; Stensnes, 2006; Ulaşan, 2012). 
The results in this paper also hold significant implication on the conjecture that corruption is high in 
Ghana and is the cause of the slow pace of development. Consequentially, government’s decision to launch 
the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) in 2011 though long overdue, the evidence presented in 
this paper rationalizes that line of thinking. However, such an attempt will only work if the various 
stakeholders (MMDAs, parastatals etc.) show the much needed commitment to raid the menace from the 
grassroots. Incidental and systematic corruption is high in Ghana and often times due to the nature they 
assume, they go unnoticed or treated with impunity. The scourge of petty corruption on national development 
is thus underestimated in most cases.  
28 
 
As a result, we recommend the reference point of this agency to be in tackling incidental corruption 
in the MMDAs, customs and police services as these are the main sources of petty corruption. Although this 
initiative is laudable, there are some questions that need clarifications. To what extent will this agency be 
independent to tackle corruption without fear or favor? How different will its mandate be from existing 
bodies? Are there mechanisms put in place to avoid conflict of interests and duplication of functions? We 
recommend further qualitative research to explore and present an in-depth account to answer these 
questions. In addition, relevant draconian measures should be reintroduced and applied where necessary to 
reduce impunity in cases involving corruption.   
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